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Mr.  Chairman,  it has  been  a  privilege for  me  to  have  attended 
these proceedings.  We  have  had  a  very clear and workmanlike 
account  from  Claude Villain of  developments  in the  Common 
Agricultural Policy.  And  we  had  a  very rich and  informative 
diet of reports  on particular food  sectors.  I  hope it will  not 
appear  too much  of  an  anti-climax if I  try and give  you  today 
some  reflections on agricultural  trade between  the European 
Community  and  the United States where  I  live and  work  and  where 
I  represent the  Commission  of  the European  Communities. 
I  do  so  against  a  background which  contains  several paradoxes. 
We  have  a  contrast between  a  rising American  involvement in 
external trade and  on  the other hand  some  serious points of  trade 
conflict between  the United States and  the European  Community. 
For  something  like one  hundred years after the Civil War,  American -2-
involvement  in foreign  trade as measured  by  the percentage of 
this against its GNP  never rose  above  3-4  percent.  In  the 1970s 
it exploded.  Foreign trade  now  accounts  for  some  12  percent of 
American  GNP.  One-fifth of American  industrial production is 
exported,  two-thirds of its wheat.  In  the mid-1950s  when  the 
United States  secured its waiver  from  the obligations of  the  GATT 
in the field of agriculture,  American  farm  exports were  relatively 
small.  The  main  concern of  the  then  US  Administration was  that 
the  international  trading rules  should not  interfere  too 
drastically with  the  operation of the  internal American  agri-
cultural market.  Then  came  the great agricultural  boom.  Since 
the  1960s  the output of all  US  agriculture has  increased more 
than  50  percent.  And  between  1970  and  1980  the value of  US 
agricultural  exports  jumped  from  $7  billion to  $41.3  billion. 
Despite talk of  a  protectionist Common  Agricultural Policy the 
European  Community  remained  the American  farmers  biggest customer. 
Even with  an  over-valued dollar the  Community  ran  a  substantial 
deficit in agricultural  trade with  the United States in 1983  of 
some  $5  billion.  There is much  talk in Kansas  City  and  Chicago 
of  the United States  image  as  a  reliable supplier.  It seems  to 
me  that the  Community  is a  very reliable customer. 
Total  trade between the  EC  and  the US  in all products  in 1982 
amounted  to  some  $90  billion,  one-third of world  trade.  As 
Secretary Shultz  said  "We  must  be  doing  something right".  Yet 
despite this great increase in the American  stake in foreign 
trade  and  in trade  between us  there has  been  a  dangerous  rise in 
points of conflict between us.  These  have  not been limited to -3-
agriculture.  But if I  quote points from  outside the agricultural 
field it is simply because  they must  colour and  determine  our 
relationship. 
I  begin with  the political.  The  impression  any  European gets  in 
the  United States today  is that Americans  are less  sympathetic 
to and  easily irritated with Europe.  Partly this mirrors  a 
shift in-the United States  towards  the  South  and  the West,  a 
feeling  that their future is in the Pacific,  that Europe was 
over-rated by  the old East Coast Establishment.  Partly  a  feeling 
that Europeans  are  quick to benefit from American help but less 
ready to  stand up  and  be  counted when  America  needs  their help. 
We  may  disagree with  these  sentiments.  But  they exist.  And  in 
an  election year  they  need  careful attention. 
Then  some  examples  of particular difficulties.  The  arrangement 
which  we  concluded  in October  1982  with  the United States 
Administration to limit our  steel exports  to the United States, 
a  trade extending  to  some  several million tons,  has  been placed 
in danger  by  an  escape  clause petition filed by  a  major  American 
steel  company.  Escape  clause petitions have  been or are  about  to 
be  filed in  a  whole  range  of  other cases  - footwear,  copper,  and 
stainless steel  flatware  - bills are before Congress  to enforce 
reciprocity sector by  sector  in wine  and  to limit globally steel 
imports,  and  countervailing and  anti-dumping  complaints  have  been 
filed on wine. -4-
Then  we  recently had  to make  compensatory  increases  in the tariffs 
the  Community  charges  on  a  number  of American  exports because  we 
were  unable  to secure  adequate  compensation under  the  GATT  rules 
for  the  restrictions  the  United States Administration placed on 
imports  of  specialty steel in the  summer  of last year.  On  more 
general  subjects we  have  expressed our  concern to  the Americans 
about  unitarv taxation -a system prevalent in several States of 
the  Union  that taxes  firms  on  the basis of  their worldwide  profits 
and  not  simply  on  their manufacturing operations in that State. 
We  are  concerned about  the Export Administration Act.  This  has 
been  due  for  some  time  to be  renewed  and  we  are  apprehensive 
about  the extraterritorial provisions likely to be  adopted. 
On  the macro-economic  front high interest rates in the  United 
States and  the  strength of  the dollar are  causing us  some  alarm. 
High  interest rates mean  that interest rates in Europe  have  to 
be maintained higher than would  otherwise be  necessary  - with  a 
dampening  effect on  a  slow European  recovery  from  recession. 
And  the  strength  of  the dollar,  fuelled of  course  by high  interest 
rates  - while it does  mean  an  increase in  US  imports  - has 
dangerously  increased American protectionist pressures in  an 
election year. 
And  our  disagreements  do  not  exclude  the agricultural  sector. 
This  is an  area where  we  have  had .some  of  our longest arguments 
with American  friends.  The  major argument  has  centred on 
subsidies.  The  claim is often made  in  the  United States that -5-
the Europeans  are  selfishly subsidising massively their 
agricultural exports  thus  capturing overseas markets  and  taking 
bread out of  the mouth  of  the American  farmer.  We  point to the 
existence of massive  agricultural  subsidies  on  both  sides of 
the Atlantic.  The  total Community  budget for  1983  amounted  -
at current exchange  rates  - to  some  $20  billion - of which 
$13.5 billion was  spent on agriculture.  But price  support alone 
in  the  United States for that year  amounted  to over  $20  billion -
PIK  excluded  - in other words  more  than all Community  spending. 
I  offer these observations not to score points but to register 
the  fact  that subsidies  to agriculture,  whether  Adam  Smith would 
have  agreed with  them  or not,  are  a  political fact in the modern 
world. 
The  last major  round of  trade negotiations,  the  Tokyo  Round  which 
was  concluded  in 1979,  recognised agricultural  subsidies as  a 
fact of life.  And  the rules laboriously hammered  out allowed 
subsidies to agricultural exports providing that these were  not 
used  to  take more  than  an  equitable  share of  the world market. 
What,  our  American  friends  ask,  is equitable.  We  explain that 
this is rather like drafting  a  definition of  an  elephant. 
Difficult,  but when  an  elephant enters  the  room at a  trot,  one 
can usually guess  the kind of  animal  involved. 
Let me  give you  just two  sets of  figures.  In the  1970s  Community 
exports of wheat  and wheat  flour  combined  rose  from  10  percent to 
14  percent of  the world market.  Certainly an  increase  and  an -6-
increase in exports which  were  subsidised.  But  the United States 
share of world  trade  rose  from  34  to  46  percent.  I  make  this 
point not in accusatory  fashion,  but simply  to  say  that the well-
known  figure  of  British  common  law,  the  man  on  the  Clapham 
omnibus,  would  find it difficult concluding  from  this that we 
were  breaking  the  international trading rules or hogging  the 
world market. 
We  talked about this in Brussels in December  1982  when  Secretary 
Shultz  and  four  of his Cabinet colleagues sat down  with  Gaston 
Thorn, the President of  the  European  Commissio~ and his  team. 
We  agreed  to talk about agricultural  exports  subsidies.  And  we 
have  made  some  progress.  The  discussions cleared away  a  great 
statistical undergrowth  of mismatching  figures  and misconceptions. 
We  isolated three main  problem areas.  Grains,  dairy products  and 
poultry.  We  established in the  case  of poultry that both  our 
shares of  the world market  had dropped while that of  Brazil  had 
substantially increased.  That left us with dairy products  and 
grains. 
And  here,  as Claude Villain explained yesterday,  we  have  put 
forward  some  major  proposals to the  Council  for  changes  in the 
Common  Agricultural Policy  and  for  a  limitation of  support.  In 
summary  the proposed  Community  farm  package would 
(a)  restrict the volume  of their production  on which  farmers 
are entitled to receive  a  guaranteed price; -7-
(b)  require  EC  farmers  to foot  the bill for their own  over-
production; 
(c)  reduce  the  EC  world price gap. 
This  package  represents  a  major  shift in  the direction urged 
for  years  by  US  critics of  the  CAP  and  should  be welcome  news  for 
US  farmers  who  have  long  complained  about the European  Community's 
"extravagant"  farm  spending. 
But  the  package  has  some  external effects.  The  proposals  would 
require  substantial  sacrifices from  EC  farmers  and  have  not 
generally been well  received by  them.  When  the  EC  is asking its 
own  farmers  to make  sacrifices and  in fact to control their 
production,  which  would  in fact be  of  substantial benefit to our 
trading partners,  the  Commission  believes that it is -not 
unreasonable for  the  Community  to  review its treatment of  competing 
imports  provided that this is done  strictly in accordance with  the 
international trading rules set out in GATT. 
So  let me  spell out what we  propose.  First in relation to grain 
substitutes.  The  EC  cannot  implement  a  guarantee  threshold for 
grain  and  move  its prices  towards  those  of its competitors 
without stabilising imports of grain substitutes.  These  displace 
Community  grown  cereals in animal  feed  and  have  the effect of 
forcing more  EC  grain  on  to the world market.  This is not  a 
proposal  aimed  specifically at the United States.  Substitutes 
are  imported  from  a  wide  range  of  sources  and  satisfactory -8-
arrangements  have  already been made  for  manioc  and  bran  coming 
from  South East Asia  and  elsewhere.  It is now  proposed to 
stabilise the  imports of other  important substitutes  - corn 
gluten feed  for  example.  Imports  of  corn gluten feed  have  in 
fact  soared from  700,000  tons  to  3.5 million tons  since  1974. 
What  is being  proposed for  corn gluten therefore is not banning 
imports  or reducing  them,  but stabilising these  imports after 
discussion with  the  EC's  major  suppliers  and  in full  accordance 
with  the  GATT  rules. 
Then  the oils and  fats  tax which  we  have  proposed to our  Council 
of Ministers.  This proposal  has  been presented as  an  external 
measure  which will  impair  the duty-free access  to the  Community 
of  soyabeans,  soyameal  and other oil  seeds  and oil  seed products 
valued at about  $4  billion in 1982.  This is not  so. 
First the tax would be  a  non-discriminatory sales tax  on all oils 
and  fats  (excluding  butter)  consumed  in Europe whether  produced 
locally or  imported.  Imports would  not be  treated differently 
from  domestic products;  this non-discriminatory treatment  squares 
fully with  the  international trading rules.  Imports  of  soyabeans 
and  meal  would  not  be  directly affected. 
But,  you might ask,  will  there  no~ be  an  indirect effect?  We  do 
not  think  so  to  any discernible degree.  Of  12 million tons  of 
soyabeans we  import  from  the United States the  bulk goes  to 
animal  feed.  Only  some  2  million tons goes  into the  production 
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in Europe,  mainly  in Germany  and  the Netherlands,  of soy  abean oil. 
Some  300,000  tons  of  that is exported  from  Europe  and  some  goes 
to industries here.  But  1.7 million tons  or less of  soyabean 
oil produced for  domestic  consumption  is only part of  a  total 
volume  of  up  to  8  million tons  of oils and  fats produced in 
Europe  and  covered by  this  tax.  The  tax we  propose is at a 
modest  level.  It would  raise retail prices  by  something like 
8  percent.  And  this is not likely - combined with  the reduction 
in butter subsidies  - to alter consumption patterns of  soyabean 
oil or margarine.  In  the  second place the modest  tax we  suggest 
would  have  a  proportionally greater effect on  the lower priced 
oils  such  as  rapeseed oil.  This proposal  does  not subject our 
imports  of  soyabeans,  soyameal  or  any other oil  seed  to  any 
restriction or levy. 
It has  been  asked whether  the  United States will bear the burden 
of  the changes  in the  CAP  we  have  suggested. 
Let me  make it clear that this major  package  of proposals has 
not been  designed  to shift the burden of  adjustment  away  from 
European  agriculture onto the  shoulders of  US  exporters  and 
others. 
First,  soyabean  exports  should not be  affected by  the proposed 
tax  on  vegetable oil. 
Second,  the stabilisation of  imports of  corn gluten  feed  and  other 
substitutes will be  carried out  in compliance with  GATT  rules. -10-
Third,  European  farmers  would  bear  the major  burden  of  the 
reforms which  would 
follow  a  stringent price policy for  farm  products  - the 
Commission's  recent price proposals are  clear evidence of  this 
fix  prices for  some  surplus  commodities  for more  than  one 
marketing  year 
set production quotas with  severe penalties for  farmers  who 
exceed  them. 
extend guarantee thresholds 
reduce  EC  support buying  to prop  up  farm  prices 
discontinue  many  other  forms  of  financial  assistance. 
The  Commission's  proposals are  a  tough  package of measures which 
call for major  sacrifices by  European  farmers  but which  are 
unlikely to  reduce  current levels of  US  agricultural exports  to 
the  EC.  In  fact,  world wide  the  US  farmer  stands to benefit  from 
the  cutbacks  in the production of  EC  products which  compete with 
US  products  in third markets. 
But  one  question  remains  about reactions in the United States. 
And it is an  important  one.  There  are voices  raised  saying  that 
if the  Community  even wants  to start talking about  stabilising 
imports  of  corn gluten  feed  then  there  should be  immediate  US 
retaliation.  And  there is talk of retaliation in the wine  sector. 
For  by  some  sinister statistical coincidence  Community exports  of 
wine  to the  United States - in 1982  at  some  $668  million  - amount -11-
to  about  the  same  as  Community  imports  from  the United States 
of  corn gluten feed. 
Here  we  should  on  our  side make  several points clear.  We  have 
every  sympathy with  the  concern that is bound  to be felt in the 
United States  - particularly in the agricultural States in an 
election year  - about measures  in the  Community  which would 
limit  ex~orts from  American  farmers  to Europe.  But what  we  are 
proposing  in relation to corn gluten feed is only  one part of  a 
major  attempt to reshape  the  Common  Agricultural Policy,  to cut 
subsidies  and  to reduce  the gap  between  EC  prices and world 
prices.  This  should  be  of direct benefit to American  wheat 
exporters.  And  furthermore  this has  been  seen in the United 
States as  a  golden  path which  we  have  been  asked  for  years to 
follow.  We  cannot  follow it if we  exempt  competing  imports  from 
the  equation. 
Secondly,  that wine  has  a  psychological  and political  importance 
in the  Community  which  should not be  underestimated by  our 
American  friends.  I  hear much  talk when  I  visit the Middle  West 
of  the  fundamental  political and  social  importance of certain 
major  agricultural  commodities.  Well  and  good  but this applies 
in full measure  on our  side  to wine. 
Thirdly,  what we  are proposing is foursquare within the  GATT 
trading rules.  Article XXVIII  provides  that any  concession  -
and  we  have  bound  our  imports  of  corn  gluten feed  duty free  - can -12-
be  modified  in discussion  and after agreement  on  appropriate 
compensation.  It would  be  completely contrary to the principles 
and  the practice of  the international trade rules as  embodied  in 
the  GATT  if any  Contracting Party were  to refuse to  engage  in 
discussion under  the  GATT  rules and  were  instead to put into 
effect immediate  retaliation.  Let us  by all means  argue  about 
the  amount  of  trade  involved by  stabilisation and discuss the 
compensa~ion which  would  be  appropriate.  But let neither of  us 
shoot  from  the hip.  To  do  so would  be  the beginning  of  the  end 
of  the  one  world  trading  system which  the United States has  done 
much  across  the  years  to support  and which  has  been  responsible 
over  the last thirty-five years for  the biggest increase in 
prosperity in the  recorded history of  the West. 
Let  me  give  one  example.  In  the  summer  of  last year  the  United 
States  imposed additional restrictions on  imports of  specialty 
steel.  This hit us,  the European  exporters.  But  we  did not  shoot 
from  the hip.  We  made  it clear that we  disagreed with  the United 
States decision.  But all of  us  know  that governments  everywhere 
come  under  pressures and must  make  a  political  judgement about 
what to do.  So  we  engaged  in the very procedure  - Article XXVIII 
of  the  GATT  - I  have  mentioned.  We  tried to  agree  on  compensation 
in the  shape  of  lower American tariffs on  other goods  to 
re-establish overall balance  of advantage.  The  discussions were 
friendly  and  constructive  and  we  twice  extended  the deadline. 
But  in the  end we  came  to the  view  that the  compensation offered 
was  not  enough  to  defend  to our clients and  we  therefore gave  due -13-
notice  - without dramatisation  - that we  intend to  take counter-
measures  on  a  modest list of  American  exports  to  the  Community. 
An  opposite course is provided by  the Wine  Equity Bill.  This 
would  seek  to enforce strict reciprocity in the wine  sector, 
country by  country.  But  the international trading  system since 
the war,  from  which  the United States has derived  such benefit, 
has  been  based  on  an overall balance of  advantage  and  on  equal 
treatment for all countries subject only to carefully drafted 
exceptions.  Any  legislative measure  which begins  to tear up  the 
international  trading  rules would  soon  be regretted by all. 
So  what  we  need  to do  is what  we  did across  the Atlantic in the 
case  of  steel  - keep  our  cool,  bear in mind  the big picture,  the 
total  trade across  the Atlantic and act in accordance-with  the 
international trading rules.  The  international  trading rules  -
like the  law  as felt by  the citizen in any  country  - can  be 
inconvenient but they are the only rules we  have  and  the  choice 
is between  anarchy  and  accumulative disaster  and  peace  in the 
valley.  I  very  much  hope  that we  can  follow this path in any-
thing we  decide  on  corn gluten feed  and  on oils and  fats. 
If we  can  continue  on  this track  through  the various  storms,  if 
we  can retain the political will  to hang  together rather than 
hanging  separately,  if we  can bear in mind  that we  are both 
steering the  same  general  course  on  subsidies both  in agriculture 
and  in industry then  we  can not only avoid  a  smash,  we  can build 
a  more  secure  and  more  prosperous West. 